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Abstract
The importance of transformations and normal forms in logic programming, and gen-
erally in computer science, is well documented. This paper investigates transformations
and normal forms in the context of Defeasible Logic, a simple but efficient formalism for
nonmonotonic reasoning based on rules and priorities. The transformations described in
this paper have two main benefits: on one hand they can be used as a theoretical tool
that leads to a deeper understanding of the formalism, and on the other hand they have
been used in the development of an efficient implementation of defeasible logic.
1 Introduction
Normal forms play an important role in computer science. Examples of areas where normal
forms have proved fruitful include logic, where normal forms of formulae are used both for the
proof of theoretical results and in automated theorem proving, and relational databases [7],
where normal forms have been the driving force in the development of database theory and
principles of good data modelling.
In computer science, usually normal forms are supported by transformations, operational
procedures that transform initial objects (such as programs or logical theories) to their normal
form. Such transformations are important for two main reasons:
1. They support the understanding and assimilation of new concepts because they allow
one to concentrate on certain forms and key features only. Thus transformations can be
useful as theoretical tools.
2. They support the optimized execution of a language; therefore they can facilitate the
development of algorithms (see resolution [19]; for the significance of transformations in
logic programming see [17]). Thus transformations are also useful in implementations.
In this paper we will study transformations in the setting of a particular logical formalism,
Defeasible Logic [15, 16], following the presentation of [6]. Benefits flowing out of our results
fall into both categories mentioned above.
Defeasible Logic is an approach to nonmonotonic reasoning [1, 14] that has a very distinctive
feature: It was designed to be easily implementable right from the beginning, unlike most
other approaches. Recent implementations include Deimos [20, 13], a query answering system
capable of dealing with 100,000s of defeasible rules; and Delores [13], a system that calculates
all conclusions, which makes use of the transformations presented in this paper.
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Defeasible Logic is historically the first of a family of approaches based on the idea of logic
programming without negation as failure. More recent logics in this family include courteous
logic programs [10] and LPwNF [9]; interestingly Defeasible Logic was shown to be the most ex-
pressive of these systems (w.r.t. sceptical reasoning) [5]. This family of approaches has recently
attracted considerable interest. Apart from implementability, its use in various application
domains has been advocated, including the modelling of regulations and business rules [11, 3],
modelling of contracts [18], and the integration of information from various sources [4].
There are five kinds of features in Defeasible Logic: facts, strict rules, defeasible rules,
defeaters, and a superiority relation among rules. Essentially the superiority relation provides
information about the relative strength of rules, that is, it provides information about which
rules can overrule which other rules. A program or knowledge base that consists of these items
is called a defeasible theory.
After an introduction of Defeasible Logic in section 2, in section 3 we conduct a detailed
study of the proof theory of Defeasible Logic. As a consequence, we show that for every
defeasible theory T there is an equivalent theory T ′ which has an empty superiority relation,
and neither defeaters nor facts. However in section 3 no insight is provided as to how T ′ might
be computed by transforming the original theory T . This question is the driving force for the
remainder of the paper.
In section 4 we introduce two key properties of transformations, modularity and incre-
mentality. Essentially modularity says that a transformation may be applied to each unit of
information, independent of its context; stated another way, a modular transformation may be
applied to a part of a program or theory without the need to notify or modify the rest. And
incrementality says that if a theory has been transformed, then an update in the original theory
should have cost proportional to the change, without the need to transform the entire updated
theory anew. Obviously both properties are important for implementations.
After establishing these properties we proceed to present in section 5, the main section of
this paper, transformations that
• normalize a theory by eliminating facts and separating the definite and defeasible reason-
ing levels as much as possible;
• eliminate defeaters;
• lead to an empty superiority relation,
without changing the meaning of the defeasible theory (in the original language). For each
of these transformations we study which of the two key properties they satisfy. Moreover, in
case they do not satisfy modularity or incrementality, we show that there is no other (correct)
transformation that satisfies the property. Finally we present a significantly simplified proof
theory that can be used once all these transformations have been applied.
2 Basics of Defeasible Logic
2.1 An Informal Presentation
We begin by presenting the basic ingredients of Defeasible Logic. A defeasible theory (a knowl-
edge base in Defeasible Logic, or a defeasible logic program) consists of five different kinds of
knowledge: facts, strict rules, defeasible rules, defeaters, and a superiority relation.
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Facts are indisputable statements, for example, “Tweety is an emu”. Written formally, this
would be expressed as emu(tweety).
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indisputable (e.g. facts)
then so is the conclusion. An example of a strict rule is “Emus are birds”. Written formally:
emu(X)→ bird(X).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example of such a rule
is “Birds typically fly”; written formally:
bird(X)⇒ flies(X).
The idea is that if we know that something is a bird, then we may conclude that it flies, unless
there is other, not inferior, evidence suggesting that it may not fly.
Defeaters are rules that cannot be used to draw any conclusions. Their only use is to prevent
some conclusions. In other words, they are used to defeat some defeasible rules by producing
evidence to the contrary. An example is “If an animal is heavy then it might not be able to
fly”. Formally:
heavy(X)❀ ¬flies(X).
The main point is that the information that an animal is heavy is not sufficient evidence to
conclude that it doesn’t fly. It is only evidence that the animal may not be able to fly. In
other words, we don’t wish to conclude ¬flies(X) if heavy(X), we simply want to prevent a
conclusion flies(X).
The superiority relation among rules is used to define priorities among rules, that is, where one
rule may override the conclusion of another rule. For example, given the defeasible rules
r : bird(X) ⇒ flies(X)
r′ : brokenWing(X) ⇒ ¬flies(X)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether a bird with
broken wings can fly. But if we introduce a superiority relation > with r′ > r, then we can
indeed conclude that the bird cannot fly.
Notice that a cycle in the superiority relation is counter-intuitive. In the above example, it
makes no sense to have both r > r′ and r′ > r. Consequently, we will focus on cases where the
superiority relation is acyclic.
Another point worth noting is that, in Defeasible Logic, priorities are local in the following
sense: Two rules are considered to be competing with one another only if they have complemen-
tary heads. Thus, since the superiority relation is used to resolve conflicts among competing
rules, it is only used to compare rules with complementary heads; the information r > r′ for
rules r, r′ without complementary heads may be part of the superiority relation, but has no
effect on the proof theory.
2.2 Formal Definition
In this paper we restrict attention to essentially propositional Defeasible Logic. Rules with free
variables are interpreted as rule schemas, that is, as the set of all ground instances; in such
cases we assume that the Herbrand universe is finite. We assume that the reader is familiar
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with the notation and basic notions of propositional logic. If q is a literal, ∼q denotes the
complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p then ∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then ∼q is p).
Rules are defined over a language (or signature) Σ, the set of propositions (atoms) and labels
that may be used in the rule.
A rule r : A(r) →֒ C(r) consists of its unique label r, its antecedent A(r) (A(r) may be
omitted if it is the empty set) which is a finite set of literals, an arrow, and its head (or
consequent) C(r) which is a literal. In writing rules we omit set notation for antecedents and
sometimes we omit the label when it is not relevant for the context. There are three kinds of
rules, each represented by a different arrow. Strict rules use →, defeasible rules use ⇒, and
defeaters use ❀.
Given a set R of rules, we denote the set of all strict rules in R by Rs, the set of strict and
defeasible rules in R by Rsd, the set of defeasible rules in R by Rd, and the set of defeaters in
R by Rdft. R[q] denotes the set of rules in R with consequent q.
A superiority relation on R is a relation > on R. When r1 > r2, then r1 is called superior
to r2, and r2 inferior to r1. Intuitively, r1 > r2 expresses that r1 overrules r2, should both
rules be applicable. Typically we assume > to be acyclic (that is, the transitive closure of > is
irreflexive), but in this paper we occasionally study which properties depend on acyclicity.
A defeasible theory D is a triple (F,R,>) where F is a finite set of literals (called facts), R
a finite set of rules, and > a superiority relation on R. D is called well-formed iff > is acyclic
and > is only defined on rules with complementary heads. D is called cyclic iff > is cyclic. In
case F = ∅ and >= ∅, we denote a defeasible theory (∅, R, ∅) by R.
The language (or signature) of D is the set of propositions and labels Σ that are used within
D. In cases where it is unimportant to refer to the language of D, Σ will not be mentioned.
2.3 Proof Theory
A conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have one of the following four forms:
+∆q which is intended to mean that q is definitely provable in D.
−∆q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not definitely provable in D.
+∂q which is intended to mean that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q which is intended to mean that we have proved that q is not defeasibly provable in D.
In section 3 we will discuss the interconnections of these concepts. At this stage we wish to
mention only one: If we are able to prove q definitely, then q is also defeasibly provable. This is
a direct consequence of the formal definition below. It resembles the situation in, say, default
logic: a formula is sceptically provable from a default theory T = (W,D) (in the sense that it
is included in each extension) if it is provable from the set of facts W .
Provability is defined below. It is based on the concept of a derivation (or proof) in D =
(F,R,>). A derivation is a finite sequence P = (P (1), . . . P (n)) of tagged literals satisfying the
following conditions (P (1..i) denotes the initial part of the sequence P of length i):
+∆: If P (i+ 1) = +∆q then either
q ∈ F or
∃r ∈ Rs[q] ∀a ∈ A(r) : +∆a ∈ P (1..i)
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That means, to prove +∆q we need to establish a proof for q using facts and strict rules
only. This is a deduction in the classical sense – no proofs for the negation of q need to be
considered (in contrast to defeasible provability below, where opposing chains of reasoning must
be taken into account, too).
−∆: If P (i+ 1) = −∆q then
q 6∈ F and
∀r ∈ Rs[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∆a ∈ P (1..i)
To prove −∆q, i.e. that q is not definitely provable, q must not be a fact. In addition, we
need to establish that every strict rule with head q is known to be inapplicable. Thus for every
such rule r there must be at least one antecedent a for which we have established that a is not
definitely provable (−∆a).
It is worth noticing that this definition of nonprovability does not involve loop detection.
Thus if D consists of the single rule p→ p, we can see that p cannot be proven, but Defeasible
Logic is unable to prove −∆p.
+∂: If P (i+ 1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and t > s
Let us illustrate this definition. To show that q is provable defeasibly we have two choices:
(1) We show that q is already definitely provable; or (2) we need to argue using the defeasible
part of D as well. In particular, we require that there must be a strict or defeasible rule with
head q which can be applied (2.1). But now we need to consider possible “attacks”, that is,
reasoning chains in support of ∼q. To be more specific: to prove q defeasibly we must show that
∼q is not definitely provable (2.2). Also (2.3) we must consider the set of all rules which are not
known to be inapplicable and which have head ∼q (note that here we consider defeaters, too,
whereas they could not be used to support the conclusion q; this is in line with the motivation
of defeaters given in subsection 2.1). Essentially each such rule s attacks the conclusion q. For
q to be provable, each such rule s must be counterattacked by a rule t with head q with the
following properties: (i) t must be applicable at this point, and (ii) t must be stronger than s.
Thus each attack on the conclusion q must be counterattacked by a stronger rule.
The definition of the proof theory of Defeasible Logic is completed by the condition −∂. It
is nothing more than a strong negation of the condition +∂.
−∂: If P (i+ 1) = −∂q then
(1) −∆q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.2) +∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
(2.3.1) ∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either
∃a ∈ A(t) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or t 6> s
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To prove that q is not defeasibly provable, we must first establish that it is not definitely
provable. Then we must establish that it cannot be proven using the defeasible part of the
theory. There are three possibilities to achieve this: either we have established that none of
the (strict and defeasible) rules with head q can be applied (2.1); or ∼q is definitely provable
(2.2); or there must be an applicable rule s with head ∼q such that no possibly applicable rule
t with head q is superior to s (2.3).
The elements of a derivation are called lines of the derivation. We say that a tagged literal
L is provable in D = (F,R,>), denoted D ⊢ L, iff there is a derivation in D such that L is a
line of P . When D is obvious from the context we write ⊢ L.
It is instructive to consider the conditions +∂ and −∂ in the terminology of teams, borrowed
from [10]. At some stage there is a team A consisting of the applicable rules with head q, and
a team B consisting of the applicable rules with head ∼q. These teams compete with one
another. Team A wins iff every rule in team B is overruled by a rule in team A; in that case
we can prove +∂q. Another case is that team B wins, in which case we can prove +∂∼q. But
there are several intermediate cases, for example one in which we can prove that neither q nor
∼q are provable. And there are cases where nothing can be proved (due to loops). A thorough
discussion of the possible outcomes of this “battle” between the two competing teams is found
in the next section.
Example 1 Here we wish to give an example1 which illustrates the notion of teams.
monotreme(platypus)
hasFur(platypus)
laysEggs(platypus)
hasBill(platypus)
r1 : monotreme(X)⇒ mammal(X)
r2 : hasFur(X)⇒ mammal(X)
r3 : laysEggs(X)⇒ ¬mammal(X)
r4 : hasBill(X)⇒ ¬mammal(X)
r1 > r3
r2 > r4
Intuitively we conclude that platypus is a mammal because for every reason against this con-
clusion (r3 and r4) there is a stronger reason for mammal(platypus) (r1 and r2 respectively).
It is easy to see that +∂mammal(platypus) is indeed provable in Defeasible Logic: there is a
rule in support of mammal(platypus), and every rule for ¬mammal(platypus) is overridden
by a rule for mammal(platypus).
We conclude this section with two remarks. First, strict rules are used in two different
ways. When we try to establish definite provability, then strict rules are used as in classical
logic: if they can fire they are applied, regardless of any reasoning chains with the opposite
conclusion. But strict rules can also be used to show defeasible provability, given that some
other literals are known to be defeasible provable. In this case, strict rules are used exactly like
1Rules in this example are actually rule schemas. Since there are no function symbols and only a finite
number of propositional constants, it is still essentially a propositional example.
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defeasible rules. For example, a strict rule may be applicable yet it may not fire because there is
a stronger rule with the opposite conclusion. Also, strict rules are not automatically superior to
defeasible rules. This treatment of strict rules may look a bit confusing and counterintuitive. In
subsection 5.1 we establish a simple normal form which separates the strict and the defeasible
part as much as possible, with only a transparent “bridge” being allowed linking the two parts
together.
Finally, in the above definition often we refer to P (1..i), or, intuitively, to the fact that
a rule is currently applicable. This may create the wrong impression that this applicability
may change as the proof proceeds (something found often in nonmonotonic proofs). But the
sceptical nature of Defeasible Logic does not allow for such a situation. For example, if we have
established that a rule is currently not applicable because we have −∂a for some antecedent a,
this means that we have proven at a previous stage that a is not provable from the defeasible
theory D per se.
3 An Analysis of the Proof Theory
We have seen in the previous section that for every proposition p we have the concepts ⊢
+∆p,⊢ −∆p,⊢ +∂p,⊢ −∂p and the complementary concepts 6⊢ +∆p etc. Finally, there are
the corresponding concepts for ¬p, which we would expect to be related to those for p. This
section sheds light on the interrelations between these notions.
We define four sets of literals encapsulating all the conclusions of a theory D.
+∆ = {p | D ⊢ +∆p}
−∆ = {p | D ⊢ −∆p}
+∂ = {p | D ⊢ +∂p}
−∂ = {p | D ⊢ −∂p}
Thus, the proof-theoretic effects of a theory are summarized in the 4-tuple (+∆,−∆,+∂,−∂).
We define two defeasible theories D1 and D2 to be conclusion equivalent if the two theories
produce identical 4-tuples. We write D1 ≡ D2.
As straightforward consequences of the proof rules, we have the following relations among
the sets.
+∆ ⊆ +∂ +∆ ∩ −∆ = ∅
−∂ ⊆ −∆ +∂ ∩ −∂ = ∅
+∆ ∩ −∂ = ∅
The four sets might generate 24 = 16 possible outcomes for a single proposition p. However,
because of the above relations, for each proposition p we can identify exactly six different
possible outcomes of the proof theory. With each outcome we present a simple theory that
achieves this outcome.
A: 6⊢ −∆p and 6⊢ +∂p
p→ p
B: ⊢ +∂p and 6⊢ +∆p and 6⊢ −∆p
⇒ p; p→ p
C: ⊢ +∆p (and also ⊢ +∂p)
→ p
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D: ⊢ +∂p and ⊢ −∆p
⇒ p
E: ⊢ −∆p and 6⊢ +∂p and 6⊢ −∂p
p⇒ p
F: ⊢ −∂p (and also ⊢ −∆p)
∅, the empty theory
We can represent the outcomes in terms of a Venn diagram in Figure 1.
D FCB EA
Figure 1: Proof Theory Outcomes
In Figure 1, the circle on the left – containing B, C, and D – represents the literals p such
that +∂p can be proved, and the ellipse inside it (i.e. C) represents the literals p such that
+∆p can be proved. The circle on the right – containing D, E, and F – represents the literals
p such that −∆p can be proved, and the ellipse inside it (i.e. F) represents the literals p such
that −∂p can be proved.
Similarly, there are the same six possibilities for ¬p. Due to the relationship between p and
¬p, many fewer than the 6 × 6 = 36 possible combinations are possible outcomes of the proof
theory. We first establish some simple results that will eliminate many combinations.
Proposition 1 Consider a defeasible theory D.
1. If 6⊢ −∆¬p and 6⊢ +∆p then 6⊢ +∂p
2. If ⊢ +∆¬p and ⊢ −∆p then ⊢ −∂p
3. If ⊢ +∂¬p and ⊢ −∆p and 6⊢ −∂p, then D is cyclic
Proof. Statements 1 and 2 follow directly from the proof rules for +∂ and −∂. Statement 3 is
proved as follows.
Suppose ⊢ +∂¬p, ⊢ −∆p and 6⊢ −∂p. If we could prove +∂¬p via +∆¬p then we could prove
−∂p through (2.2) of −∂, a contradiction. So there is a rule r for ¬p such that ∀a ∈ A(r) +∂a
can be proved.
Since 6⊢ −∂p, by (2.3) of −∂ there is a rule t for p such that ∀a ∈ A(t) − ∂a cannot be
proved, and t > r.
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Following (2.3) of +∂, there is a rule t1 for ¬p such that ∀a ∈ A(t1), +∂a can be proved
and t1 > t. Reconsidering (2.3) of −∂, there is a rule t2 for p such that ∀a ∈ A(t2) −∂a cannot
be proved, and t2 > t1.
Repeating this argument enough times, it is clear that there must be a cycle in the superi-
ority relation, since D has a finite number of rules, by definition. ✷
In terms of the the diagram (Figure 1), the properties of the previous proposition have the
following effects (where p is a positive or negative literal):
1. If p satisfies A, B, D, E, or F, and ¬p satisfies A, B, or C then p satisfies A, E, or F
(Property 1). Consequently, it is not possible for p to satisfy B or D, and ¬p to satisfy
A, B, or C.
2. If p satisfies D, E, or F, and ¬p satisfies C then p satisfies F (Property 2). Consequently,
it is not possible for p to satisfy D or E, and ¬p to satisfy C.
3. If ¬p satisfies B, C or D, and p satisfies D or E, then D is cyclic (Property 3). Conse-
quently, if D is acyclic, it is not possible for ¬p to satisfy B, C or D, and p to satisfy D
or E.
In the following table we display the possible combinations of conclusions for a proposition p
and its negation ¬p. The table is symmetric across the leading diagonal, since the treatment
of literals in Defeasible Logic – and, in particular, in the effects above – is not affected by the
polarity of the literal. Those combinations which are possible are displayed as Poss. Those
combinations which are not possible are displayed as NP (i), where i is the property number
which implies that they are impossible. The combinations displayed as NP (3) are impossible
only in acyclic theories, and can be obtained for cyclic theories, as we will see shortly.
¬p
A B C D E F
A Poss NP(1) Poss NP(1) Poss Poss
B NP(1) NP(1) NP(1) NP(1) NP(3) Poss
p C Poss NP(1) Poss NP(1) NP(2) Poss
D NP(1) NP(1) NP(1) NP(3) NP(3) Poss
E Poss NP(3) NP(2) NP(3) Poss Poss
F Poss Poss Poss Poss Poss Poss
It is easy to see that for all combinations that are possible, a sample theory can be obtained
by combining the appropriate theories for each letter, as listed earlier.
There are five combinations that cannot be obtained by acyclic theories, but are possible
when cyclic theories are permitted. These combinations are DD, BE, DE and their reverses,
for which property 3 is cited in the table above. We give below an example theory for each case.
For DD
r1 : ⇒ p
r2 : ⇒ ¬p
r1 > r2, r2 > r1
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For BE
r1 : p ⇒ p
r2 : ⇒ ¬p
r3 : ¬p → ¬p
r1 > r2, r2 > r1
For DE
r1 : p ⇒ p
r2 : ⇒ ¬p
r1 > r2, r2 > r1
From the results summarised in the above table, and the comment immediately following
it, we can draw the following results.
Theorem 2 If D is an acyclic defeasible theory, then D is conclusion equivalent to a theory
D′ that contains no use of the superiority relation, nor defeaters.
If D is a cyclic defeasible theory, then D is conclusion equivalent to a theory D′ that contains
no use of defeaters, and if D′ contains cycles then they have length 2, and each cycle involves
the only two rules for a literal and its complement.
Applying the same techniques as above, we have a simple proof that the defeasible part of
an acyclic defeasible theory is consistent. By consistent we mean that a theory cannot conclude
that both a proposition p and its negation are defeasibly true unless they are both definitely
true. This was first proved by Billington in [6].
Proposition 3 Let D be an acyclic defeasible theory. If ⊢ +∂p and ⊢ +∂¬p then ⊢ +∆p and
⊢ +∆¬p. Consequently, if D contains no strict rules and no facts and ⊢ +∂q, then ⊢ −∂¬q.
Proof. If ⊢ +∂p and ⊢ +∂¬p then p and ¬p each satisfies B, C or D. Looking at the table,
and since D is acyclic, both p and ¬p satisfy C. That is, ⊢ +∆p and ⊢ +∆¬p. ✷
The theory above for combination DD shows that cyclic theories can be inconsistent. Fur-
thermore, the formally greater expressiveness, in terms of combinations, of permitting cyclic
superiority relations appears, from looking at the above examples, not to translate into greater
usefulness. This suggests that the restriction to acyclic defeasible theories, already justified by
intuition and avoiding inconsistency, provides no practical limitation.
The results of Theorem 2 are constructive in a sense, but they are not useful in implementing
Defeasible Logic since they suggest a complete evaluation of the defeasible theory before the
construction of an equivalent theory. In the remainder of this paper we will investigate ways of
transforming an input defeasible theory to one without facts and defeaters, and with an empty
superiority relation, without performing an evaluation.
4 Properties of Transformations
Theory transformations are an important way to exploit results of the previous section. They
can be used to extend an implementation of a subset of defeasible theory to the entire theory.
A transformation is a mapping from defeasible theories to defeasible theories. Recall that
D1 ≡ D2 iff D1 and D2 have the same consequences; similarly, D1 ≡Σ D2 means that D1 and D2
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have the same consequence in the language Σ. A transformation is correct if the transformed
theory has the same meaning as the original theory. Formally: a transformation T is correct
iff, for all defeasible theories D, D ≡Σ T (D), where Σ is the language of D.
Most operations on theories are minor changes to an existing theory. If the original theory
has been transformed, say for efficiency reasons, then we would wish a minor update to the
original theory not require that the entire updated theory be transformed. This is a form of
incrementality. A transformation is incremental if the application of the transformation can
be performed on a bit-by-bit basis. Formally: a transformation T is incremental iff, for all
defeasible theories D1 and D2, T (D1 ∪ D2) ≡Σ T (D1) ∪ T (D2), where Σ is the union of the
languages of D1 and D2.
Similarly, when we change the representation of knowledge in a part of a defeasible theory,
we would like this change to be invisible to the remainder of the theory. This concept of
modularity is important in all forms of software development. A transformation is modular
if it can be applied to a part of a theory without modifying the meaning of the theory as
a whole. Formally: a transformation T is modular iff, for all defeasible theories D1 and D2,
D1 ∪D2 ≡Σ T (D1) ∪D2, where Σ is the union of the languages of D1 and D2.
Proposition 4 If a transformation is modular then it is correct and incremental
Proof. Taking D2 = ∅ in the definition of modularity, we have D1 ≡Σ T (D1) which expresses
correctness. By modularity T (D1)∪T (D2) ≡Σ D1∪T (D2), again by modularity D1∪T (D2) ≡Σ
D1∪D2, then by correctness D1∪D2 ≡Σ T (D1∪D2); therefore T (D1)∪T (D2) ≡Σ T (D1∪D2)
which expresses incrementality. ✷
In general the inverse of Proposition 4 does not hold. As we shall see in section 5 there are
correct and incremental transformations that are not modular.
5 Transformations of Defeasible Theories
Previously (Theorem 2) we showed that any acyclic defeasible theory is equivalent to one which
uses no defeaters and an empty superiority relation. Here we shall provide two transformations
that together remove defeaters and empty the superiority relation. Both are based on the same
approach. We introduce new literals that are intermediate between rule bodies and rule heads.
The effects of the simulated feature in limiting inference are simulated by new defeasible rules
attacking the inference of these intermediate literals. Since these literals are not in the language
of the original program, any inferences made by the new rules will not affect correctness.
We begin with a normalization process that eliminates facts and makes the dual use of strict
rules (in the definite and defeasible part) transparent.
5.1 A Normal Form for Defeasible Logic
We propose a normal form for defeasible theories. The main purpose of this normal form is
to provide a separation of concerns, within a defeasible theory, between definite and defeasible
conclusions. In Defeasible Logic, a strict rule may participate in the superiority relation. This
participation has no effect on the definite conclusions of the theory, but can affect the defeasible
conclusions. We consider theories where this occurs to be somewhat misleading, and propose a
normal form in which definite and defeasible reasoning are separated as much as is practicable.
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Definition 5 A defeasible theory D = (F,R,>) is normalized (or in normal form) iff the
following three conditions are satisfied:
(a) Every literal is defined either solely by strict rules, or by one strict rule and other non-
strict rules.
(b) No strict rule participates in the superiority relation >.
(c) F = ∅
Every defeasible theory can be transformed into normal form. This establishes that facts are
not needed in the formulation of defeasible logic, and that the misleading theories we discussed
above are unnecessary. We now define this transformation explicitly. Following that we prove
that the transformation preserves the conclusions in the language of D.
Definition 6 Consider a defeasible theory D = (F,R,>), and Σ be the language of D. We
define normal(D) = (∅, R′, >), where R′ is defined below.
Let ′ be a function which maps propositions to new (previously unused) propositions, and
rule names to new rule names. We extend this, in the obvious way, to literals and conjunctions
of literals.
R′ = Rd ∪Rdft ∪
{→ f ′ | f ∈ F} ∪
{r′ : A′ → C ′ | r : A→ C is a strict rule in R} ∪
{r : A⇒ C | r : A→ C is a strict rule in R} ∪
{p′ → p | A→ p ∈ R or p ∈ F}
The rules derived from F and rules p′ → p are given distinct new names.
It is clear from the transformation described above that normal(D) is normalized (i.e.
satisfies conditions (a)–(c)). Notice that strict rules have been altered to become defeasible
rules, although their names are unchanged. Thus although > is unchanged, it now no longer
concerns any strict rule.
Example 2 Consider the following defeasible theory.
e
a
r1 : a→ b
r2 : ⇒ c
r3 : c→ d
r4 : e⇒ ¬d
r4 > r3
The transformed theory looks as follows:
r1′ : a′ → b′ r1 : a⇒ b
r2 : ⇒ c r3′ : c′ → d′
r3 : c⇒ d r4 : e⇒ ¬d
r5 : → e′ r6 : → a′
r7 : a′ → a r8 : b′ → b
r9 : d′ → d r10 : e′ → e
r4 > r3
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Theorem 7 The transformation normal is correct.
Proof. We split the proof in two cases. Let q be a tagged literal in the language Σ. We
first prove that if D ⊢ q then normal(D) ⊢ q, and then the other direction, namely: if
normal(D) ⊢ q, then D ⊢ q.
Case ⇒. We prove the property by induction on the length of proofs in D.
Inductive base: n = 1. In this case a proof P consists of the single line P (1). We have two
cases: 1) P (1) = +∆p or 2) P (1) = −∆p.
Case P (1) = +∆p. According to the definition of +∆ either i) p ∈ F or ii) ∃r ∈ Rs[p] such
that A(r) = ∅.
i) If p ∈ F , then in normal(D) we have the rules→ p′ and p′ → p; according to clause 2 of +∆,
P ′(1) = +∆p′ is a proof of p′ in normal(D), then we can apply the same clause with respect
to the rule p′ → p to derive P ′(2) = +∆p in D′.
ii) The rule r used to derive p has the form→ p, and in R′ we have we have the rules → p′ and
p′ → p, so we can repeat the argument for the previous case.
Case P (1) = −∆p. This implies i) p /∈ F and ii) Rs[p] = ∅. In R
′
s we have the rule p
′ → p,
but from i) and ii) we know that there is no strict rule for p′, and p′ cannot be in F ′, since
F ′ = ∅ and p′ is not in Σ. Therefore according to −∆, P ′(1) = −∆p′ is a proof in normal(D).
We can now apply the definition of −∆ with respect to p. If Rsd[p] = ∅ then R
′
s[p] = ∅, and
trivially −∆p. Otherwise the only rule for p in R′ is p′ → p, the only rule for p is p′ → p, and
all the literals occurring in the antecedent of such a rule have tag −∆, therefore we can append
P ′(2) = −∆p to P ′(1) to obtain a proof of −∆p in D′.
We have thus proved the inductive base.
Inductive step n > 1. Let us assume that the property holds up to n. We have to consider four
cases: 1) P (n+ 1) = +∆p, 2) P (n+ 1) = −∆p, 3) P (n+ 1) = +∂p, and P (n+ 1) = −∂p.
Case P (n + 1) = +∆p. We consider only the case different from the analogous case of the
inductive base. Here we have to consider a rule r : A(r) → p, where ∀ar ∈ A(r),+∆ar ∈
P (1..n). By inductive hypothesis, each ar ∈ A(r) is provable in normal(D). However, by
construction, in D′ there is only one strict rule for each ar, and such a rule has form a
′
r → ar.
Let P ′r be the proof of ar in D
′, and +∆a′r ∈ P
′
r(1..nr). We concatenate the proofs of the ar’s,
and we append +∆p′ and +∆p. It is immediate to verify that the result is a proof of p in
normal(D).
Case P (n + 1) = −∆p. Let us assume that the property holds up to n and −∆p ∈ P (n + 1).
This means that ∀r ∈ Rs[p]∃a ∈ A(r) such that −∆a ∈ P (1..n).
We have two cases:
• If r ∈ Rs[p], then, in normal(D) we have r
′ : A(r)′ → p′ and p′ → p; thus we have to
show that normal(D) ⊢ −∆p′. The strict rules for p in D correspond to the strict rules
for p′ in normal(D). From the hypothesis we know that p /∈ F and all strict rules r for
p are discarded, then, by inductive hypothesis, the corresponding rules r′ are discarded
too.
• If Rsd[p] = ∅ then there are no rule for p in R
′, and trivially −∆p. If Rs[p] = ∅ but
Rd[p] 6= ∅, then p
′ → p ∈ R′. Since there are no strict rules for p in D, there are no strict
rules for p′ in D′, therefore normal(D) ⊢ −∆p′, and so the only rule for p in normal(D)
(p′ → p) is discarded.
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We have thus proved that in each case the strict rules for p are discarded in normal(D),
therefore D′ ⊢ −∆p.
Cases P (n+1) = +∂p and P (n+1) = −∂p. It is enough to notice that the structure (including
the superiority relation) of defeasible rules and defeaters in R′ is identical with the structure of
all rules in R. Thus, when deriving a defeasible conclusion concerning a literal from D (i.e., not
involving a new proposition), the only difference between D and normal(D) is the presence of
rules p′ → p, but such rules become relevant only when +∆p′ is provable, that means that also
+∆p is provable.
Case ⇐. or each literal p ∈ Σ the only strict rule for it (if any) in normal(D) is p′ → p. Then
if P ′(n + 1) = +∆p, then +∆p′ ∈ P (1..n); and if P ′(n + 1) = −∆p, then −∆p′ ∈ P (1..n). If
we replace each p′ with p and each rule r′ with r in P ′, we obtain a proof in D. For +∂p and
−∂p we can repeat the same considerations of the previous case. ✷
Proposition 8 The transformation normal is incremental, but not modular.
Proof. It is immediate to see that for every pair of defeasible theories D1, D2, normal(D1) ∪
normal(D2) = normal(D1 ∪D2). Consequently normal is incremental.
To see that normal is not modular, consider D1 = {a → b} and D2 = {→ a}. Then
normal(D1) = {a⇒ b, a
′ ⇒ b′, b′ → b}. Clearly D1 ∪D2 ⊢ +∆b. However normal(D1) ∪D2 ⊢
−∆b since there is no fact a′. ✷
This demonstrates, as promised, that the inverse of Proposition 4 does not hold.
5.2 Simulating the Superiority Relation
In this section we show that the superiority relation does not contribute anything to the ex-
pressive power of Defeasible Logic. Of course it does allow one to represent information in a
more natural way.
We define below a transformation elim sup that eliminates all uses of the superiority re-
lation. For every rule r, it introduces two new previously unused positive literals denoted by
inf +(r) and inf −(r). Intuitively, inf +(r) and inf −(r) express that r is overruled by a superior
rule.
Definition 9 Let D = (∅, R,>) be a normal defeasible theory. Let Σ be the language of D.
Define elim sup(D) = (∅, R′, ∅), where
R′ = Rs ∪ {¬inf
+(r1)⇒ inf
+(r2),
¬inf−(r1)⇒ inf
−(r2) | r1 > r2} ∪
{A(r)⇒ ¬inf+(r),
¬inf+(r)⇒ p,
A(r)⇒ ¬inf−(r),
¬inf−(r)⇒ p | r ∈ Rd[p]} ∪
{A(r)⇒ ¬inf−(r),
¬inf−(r)❀ p | r ∈ Rdft[p]}
For each r, inf +(r) and inf −(r) are new atoms not in Σ. Furthermore all new atoms are
distinct.
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A defeasible proof of a literal p consists of three phases. In the first phase either a strict or
defeasible rule is put forth in order to support a conclusion p; then we consider an attack on
this conclusion using the rules for its negation ∼p. The attack fails if each rule for ∼p is either
discarded (it is possible to prove that part of the antecedent is not defeasibly provable) or if
we can provide a stronger counterattack, that is, if there is an applicable strict or defeasible
rule stronger than the rule attacking p. It is worth noting that defeaters cannot be used in the
last phase. For this reason we have introduced two predicate inf +(r) and inf −(r) for each rule
r. Intuitively ¬inf +(r) means that r is not inferior to any applicable strict or defeasible rule,
while ¬inf −(r) states that r is not inferior to an applicable rule.
Independently, a somewhat similar construction is given in [12] for eliminating priorities
among defeasible rules in a credulous abstract argumentation framework. However that trans-
formation does not work properly in Defeasible Logic because of the presence of defeaters. And
if defeaters are incorporated in that model, it would still not work properly because defeaters
could be used to support positive conclusions trough counterattacks, something prohibited in
our logic (and something we consider counterintuitive). In this context it is worth noting that
an earlier version of our transformation [2] worked for a different variation of defeasible logic
where defeaters could be used for counterattacks.
Before we study the properties of elim sup we provide an example that illustrates how it
works.
Example 3 Let us consider the defeasible theory:
r1 : → gap Tweety is a genetically altered penguin
r2 : gap→ p Genetically altered penguins are penguins
r3 : p→ b Penguins are birds
r4 : b⇒ f Birds usually fly
r5 : p⇒ ¬f Penguins don’t fly
r6 : gap❀ f Genetically altered penguins might fly
r5 > r4, r6 > r5
The transformation of the above theory is
r4a+ : b⇒ ¬inf +(r4)
r4a− : b⇒ ¬inf −(r4)
r4b+ : ¬inf +(r4)⇒ f
r4b+ : ¬inf −(r4)⇒ f
r5a+ : p⇒ ¬inf +(r5)
r5a− : p⇒ ¬inf −(r5)
r5b+ : ¬inf +(r5)⇒ ¬f
r5b+ : ¬inf −(r5)⇒ ¬f
r6a : gap⇒ ¬inf −(r6)
r6b : ¬inf −(r6)❀ f
and
s1+ : ¬inf +(r6)⇒ inf +(r5)
s1− : ¬inf −(r6)⇒ inf −(r5)
s2+ : ¬inf +(r5)⇒ inf +(r4)
s2− : ¬inf −(r5)⇒ inf −(r4)
and
r1 : → gap
r2 : gap→ p
r3 : p→ b
It is immediate to see that r4 is defeated by r5, and, at the same time, r5 is defeated by r6.
However, r6 is a defeater, thus it does not support a conclusion, and, according to clause (2.3.2)
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of the definition of −∂, it cannot be used to reinstate the conclusion of r4. To represent this
fact we have to use two new literals for each rule r, i.e., inf +(r) and inf −(r). In the presence
of defeaters inf + can be used both to defeat a competing rule or to reinstate the conclusion of
a rule with the same conclusion. On the other hand inf − can be used only to defeat competing
rules.
Let us examine the transformed theory. There are no rules against ¬inf −(r6), so we can
derive +∂¬inf −(r6), thus the rule s1− is applicable; this implies −∂¬inf −(r5), and therefore
r5− is discarded: it cannot be used to support the derivation of ¬f , nor prevent the derivation
of f . Moreover, also s2− is discarded, then +∂inf −(r4) is derivable, thus r4b− is applicable.
If we defined only inf − literals then +∂f would be provable. However, we have to consider
inf + literals. There is no rule for ¬inf +(r6), so −∂¬inf −(r6), s1+ becomes discarded, and we
can prove +∂¬inf +(r5). At this point r5b+ is applicable; consequently we have two applicable
competing rules, from which we conclude both −∂f , and −∂¬f .
To formulate the following theorem we need a condition of distinctness: Two theories D1 =
(F1, R1, >1) and D
′ = (F2, R2, >2) are distinct if the rules of one theory do not appear in the
superiority relation of the other. Formally: For i = 1, 2, if the pair (r, r′) is in the relation >i
then neither r nor r′ are rules in R3−i.
Theorem 10 The transformation elim sup is modular for distinct well-formed normalized de-
feasible theories. That is, for such theories D1 and D2, D1 ∪ D2 ≡Σ T (D1) ∪ D2, where Σ is
the union of the languages of D1 and D2. Thus elim sup is also incremental.
Proof. To prove that the transformation elim sup is modular we have to show that D1∪D2 ≡Σ
D1 ∪ elim sup(D2) and D1 ∪D2 ≡Σ elim sup(D1) ∪D2. We prove only the the first case since
the second is symmetrical.
Since D1 and D2 are well-formed theories their superiority relations are acyclic and since D1
and D2 are distinct, so are >1 and >2, moreover they are defined over the rule of D1 and D2.
Therefore the superiority relation of the D1∪D2 is acyclic; moreover the superiority relation in
elim sup(D2) is empty, therefore in D1∪elim sup(D2) the superiority relation is the superiority
relation of D1, which is assumed to be acyclic.
From now on we use D for D1 ∪D2 and D
′ for D1 ∪ elim sup(D2).
We prove the theorem by induction on the length of proofs.
Inductive base n = 1. Suppose the length of a proof P is 1. The only line in P , P (1) is either
+∆p or −∆p. It is immediate to see that D and D′ have the same definite conclusions in the
language Σ since Rs = Rs1 ∪ Rs2 R
′
s = Rs1 ∪ elim sup(Rs2), Rs2 = elim sup(Rs2), and the
superiority relation does not affect the proof of definite conclusions.
Inductive step n > 1. We consider only the cases of defeasible conclusions, since, as we have
seen in the inductive base, D and D′ have the same definite conclusions.
Case D ⊢ +∂p ⇒ elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂p. If +∆p ∈ P (1..n) then D ⊢ +∆p; since D ⊢ +∆p iff
D′ ⊢ +∆p, and the latter implies D′ ⊢ +∂p.
Similarly if +∆p ∈ P ′(1..n), then D′ ⊢ +∆p; since D ⊢ +∆p iff D′ ⊢ +∆p, and the former
implies D ⊢ +∂p.
We consider the rule r from which p has been derived in D, and we consider the rules corre-
sponding to r in elim sup(D). We have two cases: 1) r ∈ R1 and 2) r ∈ R2.
1) If r ∈ R1, then r ∈ R
′. In this case ∀ar ∈ A(r), +∂ar ∈ P (1..n− 1), therefore, by inductive
hypothesis D′ ⊢ +∂ar, thus r is applicable in D
′.
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2) If r ∈ R2, then we consider the rules corresponding to it in D
′, namely:
r1 : A(r)⇒ ¬inf
+(r) r2 : A(r)⇒ ¬inf
−(r) r3 : ¬inf
+(r)⇒ p r4 : ¬inf
−(r)⇒ p
By inductive hypothesis, both r1 and r2 are applicable, that is, ∀ar ∈ A(r), elim sup(D) ⊢
+∂ar.
Let us concentrate to what happens when r ∈ R2. We have two cases a) r is superior, b) r
is not superior.
For a) if r is superior then ¬∃s : s > r, then, in elim sup(D), R[inf +(r)] = ∅, and so is
R[inf −(r)]; hence elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂¬inf ±(r).
For b) if r is not superior we consider the set of rules S0 such that s > r in D. Since D is a
well-formed theory, > is defined over competing rules; therefore S0 ⊆ R[∼p]. We consider the
transformations of such rules: s1 : A(s)⇒ ¬inf
−(s), and eventually s2 : A(s)⇒ ¬inf
+(s) if s
is not a defeater. The translation of the instances s > r consists of the rules
¬inf +(s)⇒ inf +(s) ¬inf −(s)⇒ inf −(s)
If s ∈ S0 is discarded in D, i.e., ∃as ∈ A(s) : D ⊢ −∂as, by inductive hypothesis so are s1 and s2
in elim sup(D), thus they cannot be used to block the derivation of ¬inf ±(r) in elim sup(D).
If s ∈ S0 is applicable, then according to clause (2.3.2) of the definition of +∂, ∃t ∈ Rsd[p]
such that ∀at ∈ A(t), D ⊢ +∂at and t > s. Again, by inductive hypothesis elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂at.
We have to examine two cases: i) t is superior ii) t is not superior. For i) we can repeat the
reasoning we have done in a).
For ii) if t is not superior, then we consider the set S1 = {s
′ : s′ > t}. Since D is a well-
formed theory, > is defined over competing rules; therefore S1 ⊆ R[∼p], moreover S1 ⊂ S0,
since > is acyclic. Therefore we can repeat n times the same reasoning until we arrive at a
rule t′ ∈ Rsd[p], which is superior and applicable. Hence ∀at′ ∈ A(t
′), D ⊢ +∂at′ ; by inductive
hypothesis, elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂at′ . The rules corresponding to t
′ in elim sup are
t′1 : A(t
′)⇒ ¬inf +(t′) t′2 : A(t
′)⇒ ¬inf −(t′)
Therefore elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂¬inf ±(t′). According to clause (2.3.2) of the definition of +∂.
Moreover from the superiority relation t′ > s′ for some rule s′ ∈ Sn, we have the rules
¬inf +(t′)⇒ inf +(s′) ¬inf −(t′)⇒ inf −(s′);
hence elim sup(D) ⊢ −∂inf ±(s′). We can repeat backward the steps leading to Sn, and we
can conclude elim sup(D) ⊢ −∂inf ±(s), and then elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂¬inf ±(r). We have thus
proved that both r3 and r4 are applicable in D
′.
At this point to prove +∂p, we have to show that clause (2.3) of the definition of +∂ is
satisfied. To this end, we analyse two cases: we consider a rule s ∈ R[ p]: i) s ∈ R1 or ii)
s ∈ R2.
i) If s ∈ R1, then s ∈ R
′. If it is discarded in D, then, by inductive hypothesis, it is
discarded in D′ too. Otherwise if s satisfies clause (2.3.2), we consider a rule t that defeats s.
The superiority relations of D1 and D2 are disjoint, thus no rule in D2 is superior to a rule in
D1. Moreover the superiority relation of D
′ is that of D1, thus t ∈ R1, and therefore t ∈ R
′. By
inductive hypothesis t is applicable in D′, hence, in this case +∂p is provable in elim sup(D)
ii) If s is discarded, then, by inductive hypothesis, the rules corresponding to s in elim sup(D),
s1 : A(s) ⇒ ¬inf
−(s) and, eventually, s2 : A(s) ⇒ ¬inf
+(s) are discarded too; there-
fore elim sup(D) ⊢ −∂¬inf ±(s), from which we infer that the rule s3 : ¬inf
−(s) ❀ ∼p, if
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s ∈ Rdft [∼p], or the rules
s3 : ¬inf
−(s)⇒ ∼p s4 : ¬inf
+(s)⇒ ∼p,
if s ∈ Rsd[p], are discarded. Otherwise, if s satisfies clause (2.3.2), we can repeat the same
argument of b) to prove that elim sup(D) ⊢ −∂¬inf ±(s).
In both cases we have proved that the rules for ∼p are discarded, and therefore, since there
is an applicable rule for p, elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂p.
Case elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂p ⇒ D ⊢ +∂p. If D′ ⊢ +∂p because of D′ ⊢ +∆p, then we have
already proved that D ⊢ +∆p, hence D ⊢ +∂p. Otherwise we have to consider the form of the
applicable rule used to justify the derivation of +∂p in D′. We have two cases 1) r : A(r)⇒ p
2) r : ¬inf ±(r) ⇒ p. In the first case r corresponds to itself in D′; by inductive hypothesis r
is applicable in D too. In the second case, according to clause (2.1) of +∂p, it is required that
either
elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂¬inf +(r) or elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂¬inf −(r)
The rules for ¬inf ± in elim sup(D) have form
r3 : A(r)⇒ ¬inf
+(r) r4 : A(r)⇒ ¬inf
−(r)
Again, by clause (2.3) of +∂, ∀ar ∈ A(r), elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂ar. By inductive hypothesis
D ⊢ +∂ar. The rules r1, r2, r3, and r4 correspond to rule r in D, hence r is applicable in D.
We have to consider now the rule for ∼p Similarly, we have two cases: 1) The rule for ∼p
corresponding to rule in R1, which are the same in both D and D
′ and 2) the rules for ∼p with
form
s1 : ¬inf
−(s)❀ ∼p
if s ∈ Rdft [∼p], otherwise they have form
s1 : ¬inf
−(s)⇒ ∼p s2 : ¬inf
+(s)⇒ ∼p
corresponding to rules in R2.
If a rule s for ∼p corresponding to a rule in R1 is discarded in D
′, so is in D′; if it is
applicable in D′ so is in D, and there must be an applicable rule t for p such that t > s Since
>1 and >2 are disjoint and >
′=>1; therefore t also is in R1.
For the same reason as above no rule of the form ¬inf ±(s) ⇒ ∼p is inferior to any other
rule for p, therefore all such rules must be discarded, that is, elim sup(D) ⊢ −∂¬inf ±(s). The
rules for ¬inf ±(s) are
s3 : A(s)⇒ ¬inf
−(s) s4 : A(s)⇒ ¬inf
+(s) if s is not a defeater.
Now elim sup(D) ⊢ −∂¬inf ±(s) iff 1) R[¬inf ±] = ∅, this is the case for ¬inf +(s), if s is a
defeater; or 2) the rules for ¬inf ±(s) are discarded; or 3) the rules for inf ±(s) are supported.
Case 1) is immediate, so we consider 2) and 3).
For 2) The rules for ¬inf ±(s) iff ∃as ∈ A(s) such that elim sup(D) ⊢ −∂as. By construction
the rules for ¬inf ±(s) correspond to s, and they have the same body; thus, by inductive
hypothesis, D ⊢ −∂as, and therefore s is discarded.
For 3) The rules for inf ±(s) have form ¬inf ±(t)⇒ inf ±(s), and they correspond to instances
of t > s in D. Since they are applicable, we have elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂¬inf ±(t). The superiority
18
relation in D is defined over competing rules, and since +∂¬inf +(t) can be proved, t ∈ Rsd[p] in
D. We know that if elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂¬inf ±(t) then the rules for ¬inf ±(t) must be applicable.
Such rules have form
t1 : A(t)⇒ ¬inf
+(t) t2 : A(t)⇒ ¬inf
−(t)
Thus, ∀at ∈ A(t), elim sup(D) ⊢ +∂at. By inductive hypothesis D ⊢ +∂at for all at in A(t).
From 2) and 3) we can conclude that in D there is an applicable rule r for p, such that for
every rule s for ∼p, either s is discarded or there exists an applicable rule t for p such that t is
stronger than s, therefore D ⊢ +∂p.
Case D ⊢ −∂p ⇒ elim sup(D) ⊢ −∂p. If P (n) = −∂p because +∆∼p ∈ P (1..n− 1), then, by
inductive hypothesis D′ ⊢ +∆∼p, and therefore D′ ⊢ −∂p.
Let us consider now the remaining cases. Let r be a rule in Rsd[p]. If r is discarded, then,
if r ∈ R1, then, by construction, r is also in R
′, and by inductive hypothesis is discarded in D′.
If r ∈ R2, then in R
′ we have the rules
r+1 : A(r)⇒ ¬inf
+(r) r−1 : A(r)⇒ ¬inf
−(r)
r+2 : ¬inf
+(r)⇒ p r−2 : ¬inf
−(r)⇒ p
We know that r is discarded in D, thus ∃ar ∈ A(r) such that D ⊢ −∂ar, then, by induc-
tive hypothesis, elim sup(D) ⊢ −∂ar . The only rules for ¬inf
±(r) are r±1 ; this implies that
elim sup(D) ⊢ −∂¬inf ±(r), and hence the rules r±2 are discarded.
If −∂p can be proved because its proof satisfied clause 2.3, then there exists a rule s such
that 1) s is applicable and s is not inferior to any applicable rule for p.
Again if s ∈ R1, then s ∈ R
′. Since R1 and R2 are disjoint no rule in R1 is inferior to a
rule in R2. Moreover the superiority relation of D
′ is that of R1, therefore by construction and
inductive hypothesis s is applicable in D′ and it is not inferior to any applicable rule in D′.
If s ∈ R2, we consider the rule corresponding to it in R
′:
s±1 : ¬inf
±(s)⇒ ∼p s±2 : A(s)⇒ ¬inf
±(s)
if s ∈ Rd and
s1 : ¬inf
−(s)❀ ∼p s2 : A(s)⇒ ¬inf
−(s)
if s is a defeater. In both cases, by inductive hypothesis the rules for ¬inf ±(s) are applicable.
Let us consider the rules for inf ±(s); they correspond to instances of the superiority relation
of D2, t > s, where t ∈ R[p] since D2 is a well-formed theory. Such rules have form
¬inf ± ⇒ inf±(s)
However, according to clause (−∂2.3.1) ∀t ∈ Rsd[p] either a) ∃at ∈ A(t) such that D ⊢ −∂at
or t 6> s. From be we obtain that the rules ¬inf ±(t) ⇒ inf±(s) do not exist, while from a),
by inductive hypothesis, we get that the rules ¬inf ± ⇒ inf±(s) are discarded: the only rules
for ¬inf ±(t) are A(r)⇒ ¬inf ±(t), but, by inductive hypothesis, they are discarded. Therefore
D′ ⊢ +∂¬inf ±(s).
We have to consider that a defeater t is superior to s, but from the defeater we have
no rules for ¬inf +(t), and therefore D′ ⊢ −∂¬inf +(t), thus the rule ¬inf + ⇒ inf+(s) is
discarded. Hence in all cases we are able to prove D′ ⊢ +∂¬inf +(s). That means that the rules
¬inf +(s)⇒ ∼p or ¬inf + ❀ ∼p are applicable in D′, and therefore also in this case D′ ⊢ −∂p.
19
Case elim sup(D) ⊢ −∂p ⇒ D ⊢ −∂p. We consider the form of the rules for p in R′sd[p]. We
have two possibilities:
1) A(r)⇒ p 2) ¬inf ±(r)⇒ p
In the first case the rule belongs to R1, and in D
′ we have the same rule; in the other case the
rules correspond to r : A(r)⇒ p in D, and in D′ we have also A(r)⇒ ¬inf ±(r).
By hypothesis we have a proof P in D′ where the last line in −∂p. If a rule r ∈ R′s[p] is
discarded, then if it has form 1) then, by inductive hypothesis, the same rule is discarded in D.
Let us see what happens in the other case. Here we have that D′ ⊢ −∂¬inf ±(r). The rules for
¬inf ±(r) are
A(r)⇒ ¬inf ±(r)
and those for inf ±(r) have form
¬inf ±(s)⇒ inf ±(r)
Such rules, if any, correspond to instances of the superiority relation s > r in D. Thus to prove
−∂¬inf ±(r) we have to prove either that the rule for it is discarded, or that a rule for inf ±(r)
is applicable. If it is discarded then, by inductive hypothesis the corresponding rule in D is
discarded too. If the rule for inf ± is applicable the D′ ⊢ +∂¬inf ±(s).2
The rules for ¬inf ±(s) have form A(s)⇒ ¬inf ±(s). Thus, since +∂¬inf ±(s) is provable in
D′ we have that ∀as ∈ A(s), D
′ ⊢ +∂as, then by inductive hypothesis the corresponding rule s
is applicable in D. Moreover since D2 is a well-formed theory s ∈ R[∼p].
We have now to prove that s is not inferior to any applicable rule for p in D. From the
hypothesis we know that D′ ⊢ +¬inf ±(s); this implies that the rules for inf ±(s), if any, are
discarded. Since the superiority relation of D′ is the superiority relation of D1, there is no
superiority relation on rules for inf literals.
If there are no rules for inf ±(s), then there is no rule t in D such that t > s. Otherwise the
rules for inf ±(s) have form
¬inf ±(t)⇒ inf ±(s)
Thus, if they are discarded, D′ ⊢ −∂¬inf ±(t). The rules for ¬inf ±(t) are A(t) ⇒ ¬inf ±(t),
while those for inf ±(t) have form ¬inf ±(s′)⇒ inf ±(t).
Since we have a proof of +∂¬inf ±(s), and proofs are finite sequences of nodes, we can
repeat the cycle above for a finite number of times until we arrive at a point where we can prove
+∂¬inf ±(s∗), and either we have no rules inf ±(s∗), or all rules for it (i.e., ¬inf ±(t∗)⇒ inf ±(s∗))
are discarded or there are no rules for inf pm(t∗). This implies that the corresponding rule s∗
in D is in R[∼p], and by inductive hypothesis it is applicable, and s∗ is not inferior to an
applicable rule for p.
If a rule for p is applicable in D′, so is the corresponding rule in D, and we have to show
that such a rule is defeated. To this end we consider the rules for ∼p. As usual we have two
cases3:
s : A(s) →֒ ∼p s′ : ¬inf ±(s) →֒ ∼p
2Notice that the superiority relation is empty for the inf symbols, therefore clause 2.3.2 is vacuously satisfied.
3Here →֒ stands for either ⇒, or ❀.
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In the first case s ∈ R1, and by inductive hypothesis and the considerations about the superi-
ority relation we have made above, if s is applicable and it is not inferior to any rule for p in
D, so is in D′.
In the second case we have already shown that there exists a rule s∗ such that s∗ ∈ R[∼p],
and it is not inferior to any applicable rule for p in D. Therefore in both cases D ⊢ −∂p.
Incrementality follows immediately from Proposition 4. ✷
The following result follows immediately from Proposition 4.
Corollary 11 The transformation elim sup is correct for well-formed normalized theories.
Theorem 10 imposes two conditions under which elim sup is modular: acyclicity of the
superiority relation, and distinctness (of D1 and D2). In the following we show that these
conditions are not needed for the modularity of elim sup only, but they are necessary conditions
for the existence of any modular transformation that empties the superiority relation. The
first result shows that acyclicity is a necessary condition for the incrementality (and therefore
modularity) of such a transformation.
Theorem 12 Let D = (F,R,>) be a (possibly cyclic) defeasible theory. Then in general there
is no correct and incremental transformation T such that T (D) = (F ′, R′, ∅). It follows that
there is no modular such transformation either.
Proof. Let D1 and D2 be a partition of D, where
D1 = (∅, r1 : ⇒ p, r1 > r2) D2 = (∅, r2 : ⇒ ¬p, r2 > r1)
Then, the theory D is cyclic and both +∂p and +∂¬p are provable. On the other hand
T (D1)∪T (D2) is acyclic (the superiority relation is empty); by consistency +∂p and +∂¬p are
both provable only if (1) the theory is cyclic or (2) +∆p and +∆¬p are both provable. However
−∆p and −∆¬p are provable in D so if the transformation T is correct −∆p and −∆¬p should
be provable in T (D1) ∪ T (D2), and therefore +∂p and +∂¬p are not provable simultaneously.
Thus T (D1) ∪ T (D1) is not equivalent with respect to Σ to D = D1 ∪ D2, thus contradicting
the correctness of T .
Proposition 4 tells us that there can be no such modular transformation either. ✷
Our next result states that even for acyclic defeasible theories there is no modular transfor-
mation for simulating the superiority relation.
Theorem 13 Let D = (F,R,>) be a defeasible theory. Then in general there is no modular
transformation T such that T (D) = (F ′, R′, ∅).
Proof. Let us consider the defeasible theory D consisting of
r1 : ⇒ p
r2 : ⇒ ¬p
r1 > r2
We partition D into D1 = {r1 : ⇒ p, r2 : ⇒ ¬p} and D2 = {r1 > r2}. Let us suppose
that a modular transformation T removing the superiority relation exists. According to the
definition of modularity we have D ≡Σ D1 ∪ T (D2). It is easy to see that D ⊢ +∂p. Since
D1 ∪ T (D2) contains an applicable rule for ¬p (i.e. r2) and the superiority relation is empty,
D1 ∪ T (D2) ⊢ −∂p. But then D 6≡Σ D1 ∪ T (D2), which contradicts our assumption.
✷
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5.3 Simulating the Defeaters
Similarly to what we have done in the previous section we show that the defeaters do not
contribute to the expressivity of defeasible logic and that they can be simulated by means of
strict and defeasible rules.
In the following we present a transformation elim dft that transforms every defeasible theory
into an equivalent defeasible theory without defeaters. To this end for every atom p occurring
as the consequent of either a defeasible rule or a defeater we introduce two new atoms p+ and
p−.
Definition 14 Let D = (F,R,>) be a defeasible theory, and let Σ be the language of D. Define
elim dft(D) = (F,R′, >′) where:
R′ =
⋃
r∈R
elim dft(r)
and
elim dft(r) =


{r+ : A(r)→ p+, r− : A(r)→ ¬p−, r : p+ → p} r ∈ Rs[p]
{r− : A(r)→ p−, r+ : A(r)→ ¬p+, r : p− → ¬p} r ∈ Rs[¬p]
{r+ : A(r)⇒ p+, r− : A(r)⇒ ¬p−, r : p+ ⇒ p} r ∈ Rd[p]
{r− : A(r)⇒ p−, r+ : A(r)⇒ ¬p+, r : p− ⇒ ¬p} r ∈ Rd[¬p]
{r : A(r)⇒ ¬p−} r ∈ Rdft [p]
{r : A(r)⇒ ¬p+} r ∈ Rdft [¬p]
The superiority relation >′ is defined by the following condition
∀r′, s′ ∈ R′ (r′ >′ s′ ⇔ ∃r, s ∈ R r′ ∈ elim dft(r), s′ ∈ elim dft(s), r′ > s, r′, s′are conflicting)
For each atom p ∈ Σ, p+ and p− are new atoms, that is they do not appear in Σ. Furthermore
all new atoms generated are distinct.
As we have seen defeaters neither directly support conclusions nor can they be used in the
counterattack phase; thus to simulate them we have to introduce two new atoms p+ and p− for
each atom p. Intuitively the first (p+) is used to prove p, and the second (p−) to block it, thus
they roughly correspond, respectively, to the literals p and ¬p. This is way a defeater A(r)❀ p
is translated into A(r) ⇒ ¬p−. It cannot support p, but it can be used to attack ¬p. On the
other hand defeasible rules do not suffer from this drawback, they both support, attack, and
counterattack conclusions, so their translation is twofold, and we replace each defeasible rule
A(r) ⇒ p with the rules: A(r) ⇒ p+, A(r) ⇒ ¬p−, and p+ ⇒ p. The first and the third rule
together support the derivation of p, while the second attack ¬p.
Example 4 Let us consider the defeasible theory of example 3. We apply to it the transfor-
mation elim dft , obtaining the rules
r1+ : → gap+ r1− : → ¬gap− r1 : gap+ → gap
r2+ : gap→ p+ r1− : gap→ ¬p− r1 : p+ → p
r3+ : p→ b+ r3− : p→ ¬b− r3 : b+ → b
r4+ : b⇒ f+ r4− : b⇒ ¬f− r4 : f+ → f
r5+ : p⇒ ¬f+ r5− : p→ f− r5 : f− → ¬f
r6 : gap⇒ ¬f−
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and the superiority relation
r6 > r5− r5 > r4 r5+ > r4− r5− > r4+
Theorem 15 The transformation elim dft is correct.
Proof.
We prove the theorem by induction on the length of proofs. In what follows we use P to
denote a proof in D, and P ′ for a proof in elim dft(D).
Inductive base n = 1. Suppose the length of a proof P is 1. The only line in P , P (1) is either
+∆p or −∆p.
Case If P (1) = +∆p, then elim dft(D) ⊢ +∆p. According to the definition of +∆ either i)
p ∈ F or ii) ∃r ∈ Rs[p] such that A(r) = ∅.
i) If p ∈ F , then it suffices to notice that D and elim dft(D) have the same set of facts.
ii) The rule r used to derive p has the form r :→ p, and in R′ we have the rules r+ :→ p+ and
r : p+ → p. Therefore it is immediate to see that the sequence of tagged literals +∆p+ and
+∆p, is a proof of +∆p in elim dft(D).
Case If P (1) = −∆p, then elim dft(D) ⊢ −∆p. According to the definition −∆ both p /∈ F and
Rs[p] = ∅. By construction of elim dft(D) p /∈ F
′ and R′s[p] = ∅; therefore elim dft(D) ⊢ −∆p.
Case If P ′(1) = +∆p, then D ⊢ +∆p. All strict rules (if any) for p in elim dft(D) have form
p+ → p, thus p has to be a fact. The set of facts in elim dft(D) and D is the same, thus
D ⊢ +∆p.
Case If P ′(1) = −∆p, then D ⊢ −∆p. p /∈ F ′ and R′s[p] = ∅, but by construction of elim dft(D)
this is possible only if p /∈ F and Rs[p] = ∅. Therefore D ⊢ −∆p.
Inductive base n > 1. We assume that the theorem holds for proof with less than n + 1 lines.
We prove only the cases different from the inductive base.
Case If P (n+ 1) = +∆p, then elim dft(D) ⊢ +∆p. In this case we have a rule r ∈ Rs[p] such
that ∀a ∈ A(r), +∆a ∈ P (1..n). In elim dft(r) we have the rules
r+ : A(r)→ p+ r : p+ → p
By inductive hypothesis r+ is applicable, thus we can derive +∆p+, which implies that r is
applicable too; therefore elim dft(D) ⊢ +∆p.
Case If P (n + 1) = −∆p, then elim dft(D) ⊢ −∆p. Each rule for p is discarded, that is,
there exists a literal a such that −∆a ∈ p(1..n). By inductive hypothesis elim dft(D) ⊢ −∆a.
By construction in elim dft(D) we a strict rule for p+ (r+) for each strict rule for p (r) in d;
moreover r+ and r have the same antecedent, therefore elim dft(D) ⊢ −∆p+. The rules for p
in elim dft(D) have all form p+ → p, therefore they are all discarded, thus elim dft(D) ⊢ −∆p.
Case If P ′(n + 1) = +∆p, then D ⊢ +∆p. In elim dft(D) each rule for p has form p+ → p;
then +∆p+ ∈ P (1..n). This means there is an applicable strict rule r+ for p+. By construction
r+ corresponds to a strict rule r for p in D with the same antecedent; by inductive hypothesis
r is applicable too, consequently D ⊢ +∆p.
Case If P ′(n+1) = −∆p, then D ⊢ −∆p. The rules for p have form p+ → p, therefore −∆p+ ∈
P ′(1..n). This means that every rule for p+ is discarded. By construction of elim dft(D) there
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is a one to one correspondence between the rule for p+ in elim dft(D) and those for p in D;
moreover corresponding rules have the same antecedent. By inductive hypothesis each strict
rule for p in D, is discarded, thus D ⊢ −∆p.
Before proving the remaining cases we need some preliminary results. By construction the
rules in D and elim dft(D) are closely related. Defeasible rules for p+ and p− are the same as
the defeasible rules in D for p and ¬p, respectively, apart from the head of the rules. Similarly,
defeasible rules for ¬p+ and ¬p− are the same as the non-strict rules (defeasible rules and
defeaters) in D for ¬p and p, respectively, apart from head and type of arrow. Because of
the direct link between p+ and p, and p− and ¬p, we can use induction to establish direct
relationships between provability in D of p and ¬p, and provability in elim dft(D) of p+ and
p−:
Auxiliary Lemma
1. a proof of±∂p inD can be translated straightforwardly into a proof of±∂p+ in elim dft(D);
2. a proof of ±∂¬p in D can be translated straightforwardly into a proof of ±∂p− in
elim dft(D);
3. a proof of ±∂p+ in elim dft(D) can be translated straightforwardly into a proof of ±∂p
in D;
4. a proof of ±∂p− in elim dft(D) can be translated straightforwardly into a proof of ±∂¬p
in D.
Proof of Auxiliary Lemma. Because the proofs of these results all have the same structure,
we will present only one proof (claims 1 and 3 for +∂p). The interested reader should have no
problem in adapting it to prove the remaining results.
D ⊢ +∂p iff elim dft(D) ⊢ +∂p+
Suppose this result holds if the proof of +∂p takes fewer than n lines. We write D ⊢n c if
conclusion c has a proof with fewer than n lines with defeasible tags.
D ⊢ +∂q iff
(1) D ⊢ +∆q or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q]∀a ∈ A(r) : D ⊢n +∂a and
(2.2) D ⊢ −∆∼q and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : D ⊢n −∂a or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : D ⊢n +∂a and t > s
Now, using the induction hypothesis, the fact that D and elim dft(D) have the same strict
conclusions, and the close relationship between rules from D and elim dft(D), the above implies
(1) elim dft(D) ⊢ +∆q+ or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ R′sd[q
+]∀a ∈ A(r) : elim dft(D) ⊢ +∂a and
(2.2) elim dft(D) ⊢ −∆∼q+ and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R′[∼q+] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : elim dft(D) ⊢ −∂a or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ R′sd[q
+] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : elim dft(D) ⊢ +∂a and t > s
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and this, of course, is equivalent to elim dft(D) ⊢ +∂q+. By induction, this direction of the
result holds for proofs of arbitrary length.
In the other direction, we use induction on the defeasible length of proofs in elim dft(D).
If
(1) elim dft(D) ⊢ +∆q+ or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ R′sd[q
+]∀a ∈ A(r) : elim dft(D) ⊢n +∂a and
(2.2) elim dft(D) ⊢ −∆∼q+ and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R′[∼q+] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : elim dft(D) ⊢n −∂a or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ R′sd[q
+] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : elim dft(D) ⊢n +∂a and t > s
then, in the same way as above,
(1) D ⊢ +∆q or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q]∀a ∈ A(r) : D ⊢ +∂a and
(2.2) D ⊢ −∆∼q and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
(2.3.1) ∃a ∈ A(s) : D ⊢ −∂a or
(2.3.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
∀a ∈ A(t) : D ⊢ +∂a and t > s
and so D ⊢ +∂q.
By induction, this direction holds generally.
End of Proof of Auxiliary Lemma.
Now we return to the main proof. It follows immediately from the fact that the only rules for
p in elim dft(D) are p+ ⇒ p that for every literal p:
• If D ⊢ −∂p then elim dft(D) ⊢ −∂p
• If elim dft(D) ⊢ +∂p then D ⊢ +∂p
Using the inference rule for −∂ and the specific rules in elim dft(D) we have:
If elim dft(D) ⊢ −∂p then elim dft(D) ⊢ −∆p and either elim dft(D) ⊢ −∂p+ or [elim dft(D) ⊢
+∂p− and either elim dft(D) ⊢ −∂p+ or ∃s′ ∈ R′sd[∼p]∀t
′ ∈ R′sd[p] t
′ 6> s′ ].
Using the above properties, and the definition of >′ in elim dft , this is equivalent to
D ⊢ −∆p and either D ⊢ −∂p or [D ⊢ +∂∼p and either D ⊢ −∂p or ∃s ∈ Rsd[¬p]∀t ∈
Rsd[p] t 6> s ]
and this implies D ⊢ −∂p. Thus we have established that if elim dft(D) ⊢ −∂p then
D ⊢ −∂p.
IfD ⊢ +∂p then elim dft(D) ⊢ +∂p+, by the above properties. Hence, there is an applicable
rule for p in elim dft(D). If D ⊢ +∂p then D ⊢ +∆p or there is an applicable rule for p in
D and either D ⊢ −∂∼p or for every applicable rule s for ∼p in D, there is an applicable
defeasible or strict rule t for p in D such that t > s. (Here a rule is applicable if its body can
be proved defeasibly.)
Thus elim dft(D) ⊢ +∆p or elim dft(D) ⊢ −∂p− or for every applicable rule s′ for ∼p in
elim dft(D), there is an applicable defeasible or strict rule t′ for p in elim dft(D) such that
t′ >′ s′.
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In the first case, clearly elim dft(D) ⊢ +∂p. In the second case, elim dft(D) ⊢ −∂∼p. In
both this and the third case, it now follows that elim dft(D) ⊢ +∂p since, as observed above,
there is an applicable rule for p in elim dft(D).
Thus we have established that if D ⊢ +∂p then elim dft(D) ⊢ +∂p. ✷
Proposition 16 The transformation elim dft is incremental, but not modular.
Proof. The incrementality is immediate since given any two defeasible theories D1 and D2,
elim dft(D1 ∪D2) = elim dft(D1) ∪ elim dft(D2).
To show that it is not modular, let us consider D1 = {❀ p}, D2 = {⇒ ¬p} and Σ = {p}. It
is immediate to see that D1∪D2 ⊢ −∂¬p. elim dft(D1) = {⇒ ¬p
−}, then elim dft(D1)∪D2 ⊢
+∂¬p. Therefore D1 ∪D2 6≡Σ elim dft(D1) ∪D2. ✷
The next result shows that, in fact, we cannot eliminate defeaters in a modular way. In the
following a set of rules R denotes the defeasible theory (∅, R, ∅) (which may be obtained by
application of normal followed by elim sup).
Theorem 17 There is no modular transformation that transforms every defeasible theory D
into a theory D′ such that there are no defeaters in D′.
Proof.
The claim of the theorem follows directly from the following auxiliary claim.
Auxiliary Lemma: Let A❀ p be a defeater. Then, in general, there is no defeasible theory R′
without defeaters, such that for all defeasible theories R, R ∪ {A ❀ p} and R ∪ R′ allow the
same conclusions in the language Σ (where Σ is the language of R ∪ {A❀ p}).
Proof of the Auxiliary Lemma: Suppose there was such an R′ for the defeater ❀ p. We will
consider three different sets R:
1. R = ∅. Since R′ behaves the same as {❀ p} we have:
R′ ⊢ −∂p, and
R′ ⊢ −∂¬p.
2. R = {⇒ p}. Since R′ ∪ {⇒ p} behaves the same as {❀ p,⇒ p} we have:
R′ ∪ {⇒ p} ⊢ +∂p, and
R′ ∪ {⇒ p} ⊢ −∂¬p.
3. R = {⇒ ¬p}. Since R′ ∪ {⇒ ¬p} behaves the same as {❀ p,⇒ ¬p} we have:
R′ ∪ {⇒ ¬p} ⊢ −∂p, and
R′ ∪ {⇒ ¬p} ⊢ −∂¬p.
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Let us first consider R′ ∪ {⇒ p}. Consider a proof P in R′ ∪ {⇒ p} of length i+ 1, such that
+∂p is its last line, and +∂p does not occur in P (1..i). By condition (2.3) in the definition of
a proof4, for every rule r with consequent ¬p there is a b ∈ A(r) such that −∂b ∈ P (1..i).
Now we ask the following question: Can we regard P (1..i) as a proof in R′? The only
difference is that now the rule ⇒ p is missing. What is the contribution of this rule in P (1..i)?
Inspection of the definition of a proof shows that the rule is only used to add a line containing
either p or ¬p. In our particular case, given that only +∂p and −∂¬p are derivable5 and given
that +∂p doesn’t appear in P (1..i), the only possible contribution of the rule ⇒ p is to derive
−∂¬p somewhere in P (1..i). Now we proceed as follows:
Case 1: −∂¬p doesn’t occur in P (1..i). Then it can be shown by a simple induction on the
length of P that P ′ = P is also a proof in R′.
Case 2: −∂¬p occurs in P (1..i). Then define P ′ as follows: We know that −∂¬p is derivable
in R′. Take such a proof P ′′. Concatenate P ′′ and P to construct P ′6. Again it can be easily
proven by induction on the length of proof that P ′ is a proof in R′. Intuitively what we did
was the following: The missing rule⇒ p may only cause problems in deriving −∂¬p in P . But
already we know that −∂¬p is derivable in R′, so we establish this conclusion first and then
proceed as in P (1..i).
In both cases we get a proof P ′ in R′ with the following property:
(∗) For every rule r ∈ R′[¬p] there is a b ∈ A(r) such that R′ ⊢ −∂b.
Now we turn our attention to R′ ∪ {⇒ ¬p}. Despite the presence of ⇒ ¬p which has no
antecedents, −∂¬p is derivable. Let P be a proof of length i+1 with last line −∂¬p, such that
−∂¬p does not occur in P (1..i). By the definition of a proof, there exists a rule r in R′[p] such
that for all a ∈ A(r) +∂a ∈ P (1..i).
Using the same argument as before7, we can transform P (1..i) to a proof P ′ in R′, such that
there exists a rule s in R′[p] such that for all a ∈ A(s) +∂a ∈ P ′. Thus we have:
(∗∗) There exists a rule s in R′[p] such that for all a ∈ A(s), R′ ⊢ +∂a.
Obviously R′ ⊢ −∆¬p because {❀ p} ⊢ −∆¬p. Properties (∗) and (∗∗), together with the
condition +∂ in the definition of a proof, show that R′ ⊢ +∂p. But also R′ ⊢ −∂p because
{❀ p} ⊢ −∂p. [6] has shown that it is impossible to derive both together. Thus we have a
contradiction. ✷
5.4 A Minimal Set of Ingredients
We have seen transformations that: (i) normalize; (ii) eliminate defeaters; and (iii) empty the
superiority relation. First we summarize the outcome of our considerations.
Theorem 18 For every well-formed defeasible theory D = (F,R,>) in the language Σ we can
effectively construct a normalized defeasible theory D′ = (∅, R′, ∅), such that D and D′ have the
same conclusions in Σ and R′dft = ∅.
4Note that {❀ p,⇒ p} 6⊢ +∆p, thus +∆p 6∈ P (1..i).
5As [6] shows, it is impossible to derive both +∂p and −∂p.
6As [6] shows, by concatenating two proof of a defeasible theory D one gets another proof in D.
7Essentially we are faced with the same situation: P (1..i) is a proof in R′ ∪ {⇒ ¬p}, we remove the rule
⇒ ¬p, and −∂¬p doesn’t occur in P (1..i). So the only possible contribution of ⇒ ¬p is to help derive −∂p.
But −∂p is already derivable in R′.
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Proof. The effective procedure that transforms D to D′ is the successive application of the
three transformations we have already described: 1. normal 2. elim dft 3. elim sup. ✷
As a result of our discussion we may view a defeasible theory as a set R of strict and
defeasible rules. Next we show that none of the remaining ingredients used in a defeasible
theory, strict rules and defeasible rules, can be eliminated while maintaining the set of con-
clusions. This should not come as a surprise, of course, since there is a technical as well as
motivational/philosophical distinction between provability based on certain, definite knowledge
only, and defeasible, nonmonotonic provability based on plausible assumptions, represented as
defeasible rules.
Proposition 19 There is no correct transformation that eliminates strict rules.
Proof. Suppose that there was such a correct transformation T . Consider the defeasible theory
R that consists only of the strict rule→ p. We have {→ p} ⊢ +∆p. But since there is no strict
rule in T (R), T (R) 6⊢ +∆p, which gives us a contradiction to the statement of the Proposition.
✷
Proposition 20 There is no correct transformation that eliminates defeasible rules.
Proof. Suppose there was such a correct transformation T . Consider the defeasible theory R
that consists only of the defeasible rule ⇒ p. Then {⇒ p} ⊢ +∂p. According to the claim
of the Proposition T (R) ⊢ +∂p. But T (R) consists only of strict rules. Inspection of the
definition of the inference conditions in subsection 2.3 (a conclusion must be derived by a strict
or a defeasible rule) shows that then also T (R) ⊢ +∆p. But {⇒ p} 6⊢ +∆p, so we have a
contradiction to the correctness of T . ✷
In the introduction we claimed that our results are useful for theoretical considerations, in
addition to the implementational issues. The inference conditions in subsection 2.3 were rather
complicated. In the following we show how the inference conditions +∂ and −∂ are simplified
after the transformations have been applied. The reduced complexity is beneficial both for
understanding the logic and for proofs.
+∂: If P (i+ 1) = +∂q then either
(1) +∆q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2) (2.1) ∃r ∈ R[q]∀a ∈ A(r) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.2) −∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q]∃a ∈ A(s) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i)
−∂: If P (i+ 1) = −∂q then
(1) −∆q ∈ P (1..i) and
(2) (2.1) ∀r ∈ R[q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : −∂a ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.2) +∆∼q ∈ P (1..i) or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q]∀a ∈ A(s) : +∂a ∈ P (1..i)
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6 Conclusion
Defeasible Logic is a sceptical nonmonotonic logic based on the use of logical rules and priorities
between them. Its features provide for a very natural expression of many of the standard
examples used to motivate other nonmonotonic logics [16]. Moreover recent work in several
application domains has demonstrated that defeasible reasoning shows great promise to be
useful in practice [11, 3, 18].
This paper studied transformations of defeasible theories. The main results showed how
facts, defeaters and the superiority relation can be simulated by the other ingredients of the
logic. In doing so our focus was on transformations that satisfy modularity and incrementality
conditions. The reason is that we should not think of a theory as a stand-alone representation
of knowledge, but rather as a module to which rules can be added (or deleted). In such cases
it is desirable for changes to be made on a bit-by-bit basis, and to be able to modify a part of
a theory independently from the remainder.
One main consequence of these results is that we can study, without loss of generality,
a simpler form of Defeasible Logic. Deeper results on a semantics for Defeasible Logic and
the relationship between Defeasible Logic and other nonmonotonic and logic programming
formalisms now become more accessible.
The other major benefit is in the implementation of systems. In fact our main transfor-
mations are utilized in an implementation of Defeasible Logic that has just been completed
[13]. The implementation relies on a linear time algorithm to compute all conclusions from a
defeasible theory without defeaters, and with an empty superiority relation. An input theory
is transformed into this normal form by applying the transformations of section 5. It is worth
noting that the transformations cause only a linear increase in the size of the defeasible theory
(to be more precise, by a factor of 3 for normalization, a factor of 4 for the superiority relation,
and a factor of 3 for the defeaters). As a result, we have a system that computes all conclusions
in time linear in the size of the defeasible theory.
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